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Hope and Despair at the Kantian  
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Moral Arguments about Making a Difference
Andrew Chignell
11.1 Kant and Kantians on animals
Kant famously—notoriously—claims that we have no direct duties to non-human 
animals. Like plants, animals1 are ‘things’ with only ‘relative worth’, he says, and so 
it is permissible to treat them (their bodies, secretions, and eggs) as mere means 
to our ends of feeding, clothing, and entertaining ourselves. The impermissible 
actions regarding animals are those that disrespect their owners or desensitize us 
to the suffering of the sentient creatures who do morally count—namely, the 
rational ones. In short: for Kant, our direct duties are to persons; any duties to 
other animals are indirect and go via our duties to persons.2
Many contemporary philosophers—including many Kantians—regard Kant’s 
arguments about animals (like his arguments about gender,3 race,4 masturbation,5 
homosexuality,6 and political revolution7) as tied to his cultural context in a way 
that makes them (in letter if not in spirit) obsolete and sometimes repugnant.8 
A few contemporary philosophers, most prominently Tom Regan and Christine 
Korsgaard, have developed alternative approaches that are broadly Kantian in fla-
vour and yet come to quite different conclusions about our obligations to animals. 
They are broadly Kantian because they cite the kinds of considerations that Kant 
himself uses in establishing the dignity of human beings. They are not narrowly 
Kantian because they conclude that we do have direct duties to animals, and that 
we may not treat them merely as means to our ends.
Regan (1983) does this by arguing that animals are, like us, sentient ‘subjects of 
a life’ (this is a technical term for him) and that this is evidence that they have an 
1 In what follows I will use ‘animals’ to refer to non-human animals.
2 G 4:427–8; Con. 8:110ff; MM 6:241, 443–4; EC 27:459, 710. 3 See Varden (2017).
4 See Allais (2016). 5 See Kielkopf (1997). 6 See Altman (2010).
7 See Flikschuh (2018).
8 But for a positive assessment of Kant’s views about animals, see Wilson (2008).
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irreducible ‘inherent value’ that confers moral standing and welfare rights. Regan’s 
view has been influential (often playing the role of the ‘Kantian’ or ‘deontological’ 
approach in animal ethics anthologies), but critics have wondered how to under-
stand the metaphysics and epistemology of the obscure conception of value 
involved.
Korsgaard (2018) tries to avoid this concern by developing an explicitly ‘natu-
ralistic’ Kantian-constructivist approach. She starts with the Aristotelian point 
that animals have ‘tethered goods’—goods for them, just as we do. One of the 
main goods for any sentient animal is to live in safe, comfortable environs; 
another is to have a full life—one that is not radically curtailed, even painlessly. 
Obviously we humans take, and require others to take, what is good for us as a 
defeasible basis for making moral claims on ourselves and others. Korsgaard 
regards such taking and requiring as conferring ‘absolute’ value on our tethered 
goods, and as ‘claiming standing’ for ourselves as ends rather than mere means 
(2018: 139). But there is no non-arbitrary basis, she says, for refusing to take the 
tethered goods of other sentient creatures into account in this way, even if they are 
not able to do so themselves. Thus
when we consider the reason why Kant thinks we must claim the standing of 
‘end-in-itself ’ for ourselves, we will see that we must claim that standing for the 
other animals as well. (2018: 130)
I have examined Korsgaard’s innovative argument in detail elsewhere (Chignell, 
forthcoming 2020), but one major problem involves the following premise (this is 
my paraphrase rather than a quotation):
Parity: If there is no difference between us and the other animals with respect to 
either the having of tethered goods or the importance of those goods, and if we 
treat our tethered goods as goods absolutely (thereby making them good abso-
lutely), then we ought to treat other animals’ tethered goods as good absolutely 
(thereby making them good absolutely).
Korsgaard argues over the course of several chapters that the two conjuncts of the 
antecedent are satisfied, and then spends the central chapter of the book arguing 
for the conditional as a whole. But an opponent could plausibly suggest that the 
reason we take our tethered goods to be part of the absolute good is not because 
they are tethered goods simpliciter, but because they are our tethered goods. In 
other words, the opponent could plausibly suggest that we treat human goods (of 
a full life, health, safety, capacities, opportunity, etc.) as part of the absolute good 
because, well, they are goods for us. Interestingly, Korsgaard herself seems to 
articulate the premise this way in places: ‘I have no other reason for taking my 
end to be good absolutely, than the fact that it is good for me’ (2018: 144).
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Instead of Parity, then, it looks like we have
Parity*: If there is no difference between us and the other animals with respect 
to either the having of tethered goods or the importance of those goods, and if 
we treat our tethered goods as goods absolutely because they are our tethered 
goods (thereby making them good absolutely), then we ought to treat other ani-
mals’ tethered goods as good absolutely (thereby making them good 
absolutely).
Parity arguments are tricky, but now this looks invalid: the italicized phrase in 
Parity* adds something to the antecedent that makes the conditional as whole 
implausible. Genuine parity would require a consequent like ‘. . . then the other 
animals ought to treat their tethered goods as goods absolutely because they are 
their tethered goods (thereby making them good absolutely)’ But that, unfortu-
nately, is not something that our fellow creatures can do.
In what follows, my goal is not to rehearse Kant’s narrow views about our 
duties to animals; nor is it to examine further these broadly Kantian efforts to 
improve on Kant’s ideas.9 Instead, I propose to draw on another part of Kant’s 
philosophy altogether—namely, his moral psychology of hope and despair—to 
develop a different line of thought about our relationship to animal products.
For these purposes I will simply start by assuming that there are sound argu-
ments (of one of these broadly Kantian varieties, perhaps, or of a more conse-
quentialist variety) for the claim that:
Don’t Farm: It is morally wrong to raise, kill, and harvest animals for the pur-
pose of selling their bodies, secretions, and eggs if there are readily available 
alternatives for us to eat and wear.
Now consider an average North American consumer of middling means—call 
him Oppy—who likes meat and cheese and omelettes and leather. He would pur-
chase these products if he could, but he believes that Don’t Farm is true, and he 
assumes, like many of us, that Don’t Farm implies:
Don’t Purchase: It is morally wrong to purchase the bodies, secretions, or eggs of 
farmed animals if there are readily available alternatives for us to eat and wear.
Recently, however, Oppy has confronted some sobering empirical facts that seem 
to problematize this natural move from Don’t Farm to Don’t Purchase. The sober-
ing empirical facts, roughly put, are that the sheer size and complexity of the 
9 For more of the latter, see Varden (this volume).
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industrial system that brings 99% of the animal products to our refrigerators and 
closets—and, in particular, the oversupply and buffers in many of its supply 
chains—make it exceedingly unlikely that an individual’s choice not to purchase 
will have any effect at all on the system, whether positive or negative. Despite his 
unwavering commitment to Don’t Farm, then, Oppy has become an opportunist: 
he thinks it is okay on occasion to privately enjoy and wear some of his favourite 
farm animal products, since (as long as he is purchasing from the industrial sys-
tem) doing so almost certainly doesn’t make a difference.10
Michael Martin (1976) and R.G. Frey (1985)—and much more recently Mark 
Bryant Budolfson (2016, 2019) and Eliot Michaelson (2016a)—have argued that 
difference-making concerns like these are pressing for consequentialist advocates 
of Don’t Purchase. This is because act consequentialism (‘consequentialism’ here-
after) endorses the following principle:
Causal Consequences Principle (CCP): Action A is morally wrong only if the 
causal consequences of A are worse than they would have been if some readily 
available alternative to A had been performed.11
‘Worse’ here is traditionally construed in a welfarist way that includes all sentient 
animals.12 So given CCP, if a private13 purchase of a chicken sandwich that is 
wrongfully produced almost certainly doesn’t cause any additional loss in welfare, 
and clearly does  lead to the goods of pleasure and nourishment, then it cannot be 
morally wrong. (It might even be morally required!) This sets up a trilemma for 
the consequentialist: give up CCP, give up welfarism, or give up Don’t Purchase 
and get comfortable with opportunism. The whole problematic is now referred to 
under the label of the inefficacy (or futility or causal impotence) objection.
Michaelson (2016b) and Budolfson (unpublished) have argued that the ineffi-
cacy objection also makes things difficult for some non-consequentialist efforts to 
move from Don’t Farm to Don’t Purchase. For instance, it makes things difficult 
for views on which only acts that involve or lead to the infringement or violation 
of rights count as morally wrong. That’s because the sobering empirical facts indi-
cate that a choice to purchase the products of a gigantic, insensitive system is 
10 For the term ‘opportunistic carnivore’, see Almeida/Bernstein (2000). For more discussion, see 
(Chignell 2016).
11 Compare Almeida/Bernstein (2000: 206) who state this as a biconditional. I use a necessary con-
dition here, since some consequentialisms will have different ways of filling out the account of moral 
wrongness. See Sinnott-Armstrong (2015).
12 Some welfarist views restrict the morally relevant outcomes to human animals. Joseph Raz calls 
this ‘the humanistic principle’: ‘the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of any-
thing derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality’ (1986: 
194). Here I am working with a welfarist picture that is not speciesist in this way.
13 The privacy condition is meant to deflect concerns about the expressive significance of one’s 
purchasing behaviour and the influence it might have on the behaviour of others.
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extremely unlikely to infringe or violate any rights. And most non-consequentialists 
of this variety will allow, in other contexts, that it is permissible to perform actions 
that are extremely unlikely to infringe or violate rights. Driving to the store, for 
instance, may end up in an accident that puts other people in a hospital; provided 
this result is extremely unlikely, however, it is still permissible to drive to the store.
Other varieties of non-consequentialism (certain forms of virtue theory, sym-
bolic or expressive value theory, divine command theory, and even Parfit’s neo-
Kantianism14) are not as obviously vulnerable to the inefficacy objection, however. 
The decision privately to purchase the products of a morally wrongful system 
may be vicious, symbolically unacceptable, expressively noxious, divinely pro-
scribed, or categorically irrational even if it has no other negative outcomes.15
In what follows, I will look a bit further at the sobering empirical facts and how 
they problematize the move from Don’t Farm  to Don’t Purchase (Section 11.2). In 
Section 11.3, though, I want to turn our attention away from Oppy in order to 
focus on another character: Hope. As we will see, Hope is someone who likes 
animal products just as much as Oppy does but takes herself to have good reasons 
for thinking that Don’t Purchase is true. These reasons might be grounded in one 
of the non-consequentialist theories just mentioned, and in any case do not hang 
on whether her action makes a causal difference to welfare outcomes. All the 
same, Hope often—and quite understandably—finds her efforts to adhere to 
Don’t Purchase threatened by her awareness of the sobering empirical facts. And 
she’s not alone in this: for all but the most impressively stoical among us, the 
awareness that our boycotting efforts almost certainly make no causal difference 
can pose a serious psychological threat to our ongoing moral resolve, even if our 
reasons for boycotting do not depend on the boycott making a causal difference.
Here is another way to put the point. The usual version of the inefficacy prob-
lem is moral-conceptual: it starts with the intuitive idea that purchasing a certain 
product is wrong, and then shows that various ethical theories imply the opposite 
in circumstances where individual choices are almost certainly inefficacious. 
The version of the problem that I develop in Section 11.3, by contrast, is moral- 
psychological: it, too, starts with the conviction that purchasing is wrong, and then 
points out that people who both recognize this and are still inclined to do it will 
often be psychologically demoralized under conditions of perceived inefficacy 
such that they are unable to resist.
14 See Parfit’s reformulations of the Categorical Imperative in response to the ‘problem of imper-
ceptible differences’ in his 2011 (341).
15 I call these non-consequentialist theories, but the relevant factors can obviously be ‘consequen-
tialized’ in a non-welfarist axiology such that the increases in exercises of virtue, symbolic value, 
obedi ence to God, practical consistency, etc. become the consequences with respect to which we ought 
to seek the optimific result. Thanks to Daniel Rubio and Ryan Darr for conversation here. See Dreier 
(1993).
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Interestingly, Kant has something much more useful to say about this second 
set of concerns than he does about our direct obligations to animals. Or at least 
that’s what I will suggest below. In Section 11.4, I reconstruct one version of his 
famous ‘moral proof ’ of God’s existence and the future life of the soul, one that he 
developed in the 1790’s towards the end of his career (just as his hopes regarding 
the French Revolution were giving way to despair). I call it the ‘moral-psychological 
proof ’ in order to highlight the fact that—unlike the better-known versions of the 
moral proof—it relies on empirical premises about our tendencies to hope and 
despair, and the concomitant effects on our psychological resolve. Like the 
 earlier and more famous versions of the moral proof, the conclusion of the moral-
psychological version is not that God and the future life exist, but rather that we 
are morally justified in having faith (the German term is ‘Glaube’16) that God and 
the future life exist. After making this detour through Kant’s theistic moral psych-
ology, my ultimate goal (in Section 11.5) is to see whether a secular analogue of 
the proof applies to people in contemporary industrial contexts who, like Hope, 
have trouble sustaining their resolve in the face of the sobering empirical facts.17
11.2  Inefficacy at KCF
Inefficacy concerns arise in many industrial contexts (leather, coffee, fabrics, 
energy, etc.), but I propose to focus on the chicken system in a world very much 
like our own: one in which 66 billion chickens are processed each year (this means 
that around 10,000 birds will have been harvested while you were reading this 
very sentence).18 Let’s also suppose that key parts of the massive supply systems 
in this world are ‘lumpy’ rather than linear. In other words, in these parts of the 
chain, supply responds to demand in large lots or ‘lumps’ rather than in one-by-
one adjustments.19 This means that there will be demand thresholds—upper and 
lower—that must be crossed in order to trigger any change in supply at all. It also 
16 Kant uses this term in a variety of contexts, and there is no good English translation of it. In 
other work I have used the Germanic-looking term ‘Belief ’ (see 2007b); here, however, I’ll use ‘faith’, 
since that is standard terminology in discussions of Kant’s moral proof of the rationality of theism.
17 I have tried to set up Oppy’s situation more precisely here than I did in my (2016) and (2018), 
but some of the argumentation is the same. I am grateful to the editors of both volumes for letting me 
incorporate revisions of that material in what follows.
18 That was the statistic in our world for 2017, according to the Food and Animal Organization of 
the United Nations. Data can be found here: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL, selected for 
World + (Total), Producing Animals/Slaughtered, Meat, Chicken > List, 2017. The number has cer-
tainly gone up since then.
19 See Michaelson (2016a) for a discussion of the extent to which the inefficacy objection hangs on 
contingent facts about the actual food supply. For doubts, partly from an economist’s point of view, 
about how much insensitivity there is in the actual world’s system, see Halteman and McMullen 
(2018). But even if systems in the actual world are not insensitive in this way, they certainly could be. 
More importantly for present purposes, they could reasonably be perceived to be that way by would-be 
moral agents.
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means that the system will be insensitive to slight changes in demand, and thus 
that an individual’s occasional choice privately to purchase a small poultry prod-
uct is very unlikely to have an effect on the conditions of the animals and workers 
in the system, or the environment and wildlife affected by it.
Now let’s consider a massive global fast food company in this nearby world—
one that is run by people who share the narrow Kantian view about our direct 
duties to animals (viz. that we have none). This company sources chicken from 
vast industrial operations that carefully comply with human health and worker 
regulations (like good Kantians) but uses intensive factory techniques on the 
birds (dark crowded indoor sheds, beak-clippers, battery cages, automated 
throat-cutters, scalding tanks, etc.) in order to maximize yield. We can call this 
company the Kantian Chicken Factory: ‘KCF’ for short.
Let’s suppose that in this world (which, again, is very much like our own) the 
regional KCF has a policy of ordering 1,000,000 chickens every month from its 
supplier in order to meet an average monthly demand just shy of 20 million 
chicken sandwiches. (I am estimating that a fast-food chicken patty contains 
around 1/20th of the edible parts of a chicken.20) More specifically, the policy says 
that if the demand in any given month is between 19,900,000 and 20 million 
sandwiches, then KCF won’t change its usual order: their supply chain managers 
are prepared to waste (or donate, when they can) that much oversupply in a 
month if they think the average demand will continue to be around 20 million 
sandwiches.21 That’s because, given how cheap the government-subsidized 
chicken fed on government-subsidized corn is in this nearby world, and how 
expensive it would be to introduce mechanisms that would allow them to track 
demand more closely, and the unpredictability of product recalls, the KCF execu-
tives figure it is worse to face a shortage in a given month than it is to throw out 
some extra supply. Moreover, average monthly demand in this region has been 
within these two thresholds every month for the past ten years. Still, the policy is 
not entirely insensitive to market changes. If the number of sandwich orders in a 
given month falls below the 19,900,000 threshold, this will trigger a ‘lump’ 
reduction in their order for the following month: they will order 995,000 chickens 
20 The average broiler chicken weighs around five pounds. The average chicken sandwich is a 
quarter-pound or less. So that’s around twenty sandwiches per bird. But a good portion of the chicken 
isn’t edible, and a lot of fat is lost in the cooking process. On the other hand, a chicken sandwich patty 
is not entirely made of chicken. The Canadian Broadcasting Company recently sponsored efforts by 
DNA researcher Matt Harnden (of the Trent University Wildlife Forensic DNA Laboratory) to analyse 
the contents of various fast food chicken sandwiches. They ranged between having 43% chicken DNA 
content (Subway) and 89% chicken DNA content (Wendy’s). The rest was a mixture of soy and other 
additives. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/marketplace-chicken-fast-food-1.3993967. So it seems 
like 1/20 is a decent estimate.
21 KCF is a fictional company, but a real-world company with a similar name processes around 2.5 
million chickens per day (i.e. 850 million chickens per year). So although the numbers I’m using here 
may seem large, they are probably much too small.
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instead of 1 million from the supplier. They have similar thresholds every 100,000 
sandwiches below that.
So now, finally, consider Oppy, who is morally opposed to farming chicken 
generally, and thus finds the industrial chicken system morally atrocious. He has 
walked into his local food court for a private lunch, and is trying to decide 
whether to purchase one of the delicious KCF spicy mesquite chicken sandwiches. 
Given our stipulations, if the number of other chicken sandwich orders during 
the month ends up being more than 19,899,999 but less than 20 million—as it has 
for the past decade—then Oppy’s decision won’t make any causal difference to the 
number of actual chickens harvested. For if he abstains, they will just dispose of 
or donate the patty that he would have purchased, and they won’t change their 
monthly order from the supplier.22 Likewise if the total number is below 
18,999,999 but above 17,999,999, then his decision also won’t make a difference. 
And so on. It is only if Oppy happens to be at the food court during a month in 
which the number of other sandwich orders, not counting his, is precisely 
18,999,999 (or 17,999,999, or 16,999,999, etc.) that his order will have any effect at 
all. But if he is on such a threshold, and if he orders something other than a 
chicken sandwich, then his action will trigger a big lump reduction and KCF will 
order 5,000 fewer chickens from the regional supplier next month.23
The situation here is a difficult one for Oppy given his commitment to Don’t 
Farm and his taste for spicy mesquite. But here we can offer him a standard reply 
from the literature on expected utility. For even if the supply chain is lumpy like 
this, a consumer can never know when he is at a pivot or threshold point, and so 
he should just equate the expected effect of his single choice with the average effect 
of all the choices between thresholds. We have already stipulated that every ‘lump’ 
order is for 5,000 chickens, and that these are only triggered every 100,000 sand-
wich purchases. So the average effect of each purchase is 1/100,000 x 5,000 = 1/20. 
In other words, the effect of Oppy’s individual sandwich purchase is precisely 
what one would predict, given the amount of chicken in a patty—namely, 1/20th 
of a chicken. It’s then an empirical question whether the thought of occasionally 
saving 1/20th of a chicken (or of saving one chicken every 20 times he chooses the 
spicy Beyond patty) is sufficient to motivate Oppy’s abstention. Many philo-
sophers who offer a reply like this argue that it should be.24
22 I’m setting aside the fact that Oppy might order a salad instead, and thereby signal increased 
demand for plants instead of animals.
23 This is essentially a large-scale version of the ‘Three-in-a-Boat’ game (named after a J.K. Jerome 
short story): If only one of us rows, the boat goes in a circle; if the two of you row, then my rowing 
won’t make a difference. So I should only bother rowing if exactly one of you is going to join me. 
Bovens (2015) argues that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is best modelled as this kind of game rather 
than a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thanks to Bovens for helpful discussion here.
24 For versions of this argument, see Singer (1980), Norcross (2004), Kagan (2011), and Norcross 
(draft). Despite some similarities, this chicken sandwich scenario poses problems for both rationality 
and resolve that are somewhat different from real-world voting situations. When voting for president, 
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The expected utility reply would make sense in a system that was perfectly or at 
least highly efficient. But the reply is threatened by the sobering empirical facts 
about KCF’s tolerance for oversupply and the decade-long trend in the region. 
Remember, KCF has received between 19,900,000 and 20 million chicken sand-
wich orders every month for ten years now, and so it is extremely likely that this 
will happen again this month. They also have a standing policy of throwing out or 
donating any oversupply between thresholds. This means there is a tolerance for up 
to 99,999 sandwiches’ worth of oversupply in the system—a buffer that keeps them 
from ever falling short of demand. But it also means that an individual decision to 
purchase or abstain in a given month is likely to be drawing from that buffer, rather 
than moving the system along to the next threshold. This in turn suggests that it 
cannot simply have the ‘average effect’ of a purchase between thresholds. In a sys-
tem with buffers, we have to consider not just what it takes to get from one thresh-
old to another, but also the size of the buffer and the regional trend.
Some people may find it implausible that a real-world analogue of KCF would 
tolerate a buffer as large as 99,999 patties per month.25 But even if that’s correct 
and the buffer is smaller, it is almost certainly not the only one. In many indus-
trial systems, even in those striving for vertical integration, there will be a series of 
buffers of this sort—a series of points along the chain where waste is tolerated or 
absorbed. KCF’s suppliers, for instance, will presumably also have some sort of 
lumpy threshold policy vis-à-vis the farmers who raise the chickens, and be pre-
pared to absorb some decrease in demand before reducing their order. Similarly, 
the farmer gets the chicks from an incubator facility, which itself will have a 
threshold policy that tolerates a certain amount of oversupply. Moreover, in a 
market as big as the chicken market, the suppliers almost certainly have other 
customers who will be able to pick up the slack in a given period, and so may not 
tell the farmer to produce 5,000 fewer chickens after all, even if KCF occasionally 
crosses the relevant threshold; likewise at the level of farmer and incubator, and 
so on: it’s a network of buffers all the way down.
If this description is coherent, then it looks like there is not a 1/20 chance but 
rather a much smaller chance that Oppy, standing at the other-worldly food court 
that day, is at a point in the industrial supply chain that will make his choice 
for instance, one might not make a difference to the outcome but still be able to signal support, or 
increase the ‘manifest normative mandate’ of the winner (see Guerrero (2010). Something similar 
cannot be said about someone who abstains from a chicken sandwich in a lumpy supply system 
where her purchase would simply be taken from the buffer. For this reason I think assimilating inef-
ficacy cases to voting cases (in the way that, e.g. Norcross (draft) and Nefsky (2017) do) can be 
misleading.
25 Again, for more discussion of the situation in the actual world, see Halteman and McMullen 
(2018).
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 efficacious. If we add in other variables26 and supply-chain ‘noise’, then the chance 
that he will buy a threshold sandwich becomes, in Budolfson’s words, ‘infinitesi-
mal’ (2016: 208). Calculating the expected effect for each customer over the 
course of the month would be difficult, given all these factors, but it is clearly 
nowhere near as high as 1/20th of a chicken.27
This is an interesting thought-experiment in itself. But our actual world also 
seems regrettably similar to Oppy’s. If that’s right, then the sobering empirical 
facts problematize the intuitive move from Don’t Farm to Don’t Purchase  in our 
world too. Rabbi Yanklowitz exemplifies this intuitive move in The Jewish Vegan 
when he states that ‘it is not hard to buy a leather-free belt to spare animals from 
unnecessary suffering’ (2015: 27). Forty years earlier, Peter Singer likewise sug-
gested that:
[b]ecoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture . . . Becoming a vege-
tarian is a highly practical and effective step one can take toward ending both 
the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them.
(1975: 168–9).
Most of us share Yanklowitz’s and Singer’s sense that we have strong moral  reasons 
to boycott products of wrongful activity on the part of others, i.e. that there is a 
way to defend not just Don’t Farm but also Don’t Purchase. However, if what mor-
ally matters is making a causal difference to the welfare of the creatures involved, 
then in our world—as in Oppy’s—lots of individual purchases of industrial ani-
mal products may be neither here nor there.28
26 For instance: cultural trends can make the demand for certain cuts of poultry go up (turkey 
breast at Thanksgiving, chicken wings during years when the local football team does well, etc.). But 
animals come in wholes, and so if wings are in high demand this year, a decision not to eat a chicken 
sandwich (which is not made of wings) is even less likely to have any effect on how many chickens 
are produced and processed, since retailers are demanding as many wings as possible. Thanks to 
conversations with Cornell food scientist and poultry expert Joe Regenstein here; see also Parcell 
and Pierce (2000).
27 Halteman and McMullen (2018) acknowledge these facts about buffers in the real-world poultry 
supply, but then note that the consumer will ‘know little to nothing about the distance to a threshold 
at their particular retailer, and even less further down the supply chain’. This is true, but in the noisy, 
buffered market situation described here, a consumer’s ignorance of precisely where she is relative to 
the next threshold seems moot—she only needs to recognize that the chance of being on any thresh-
old is extremely small. Someone like Oppy can easily come to know that the vastly most likely out-
come, given the buffer, the noise, and the trend, is that his decision to abstain will increase that 
month’s wasted oversupply by precisely one patty.
28 Note that the sobering empirical facts also suggest that the choice to purchase small, family-
farmed products is much more likely to make a difference. So if someone like Oppy thinks that Don’t 
Farm holds across the board, he should only indulge his opportunism with products from the indus-
trial system.
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11.3 Difference-making and Despair
The reasoning that motivates the negative conclusion we just reached (and the 
reasoning that Oppy exploits when he goes opportunist) is underwritten by 
something like this thought:
Badness as a Reason to Abstain: The badness of a production practice is a reason 
to abstain from purchasing its products only if abstaining has a non-negligible 
chance of making a positive difference with respect to the badness of that 
practice.
The more general principle here is:
Badness as a Reason to Act: The badness of an outcome O is a reason to perform 
action A only if A has a non-negligible chance of making a positive difference 
with respect to O.
In keeping with CCP, we are also construing what it is to ‘make a difference’ in a 
causal way:
Difference-Making, Causal: An action A makes a difference with respect to out-
come O just in case performing A causally leads to a change in O.
It would be worth thinking more about whether consequentialist ethical theories 
can rebut the conceptual version of the inefficacy objection or rule out opportun-
istic purchasing without giving up one or more of their core principles. But I don’t 
propose to go further into that debate here.29 Instead, I want to turn to the psycho-
logical version of the inefficacy problem, and the broadly Kantian argument from 
the moral need to avoid demoralization and despair.
So let’s now consider Hope, and suppose that she has been convinced by one of 
the many arguments in the literature that seek to bridge the gap from Don’t Farm 
to Don’t Purchase without appealing to causal difference-making. One family of 
such arguments invokes the symbolic value of ‘standing with the good’ and avoid-
ing ‘moral taint’ by not consuming the products of a morally objectionable prac-
tice (see Hill 1979; Appiah 1986; Boey 2016). Another invokes a theory of 
‘complicity’ or a ‘don’t benefit from wrongness’ principle that prohibits purchas-
ing even if it makes no causal difference (Martin 2016; McPherson 2016). Another 
family of arguments appeals to virtue-theoretic or psychological considerations 
that don’t require any causal difference-making (Nobis 2002; Halteman/Halteman 
29 I attempted some of that in Chignell (2016). See Nefsky (2018) for an overview of such efforts.
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Zwart 2016; Bramble 2016). Yet another emphasizes that an individual can be a 
joint cause of bad outcomes even without making a causal difference, and that the 
badness of being a joint cause can sometimes be a reason to abstain (Parfit 1984; 
Harman 2016; Albertzart 2019).
Difference-making concerns are not so easily dispatched, however. Even if 
Hope accepts Don’t Purchase on one of these other grounds, the sobering em pir-
ic al facts according to which her food choices with respect to the industrial sys-
tem—even over an entire lifetime—are unlikely to make a significant difference 
can still have a profound psychological effect on her moral resolve. In other 
words, recognition of the sobering facts might lead to a very natural kind of 
demoralization:
(D1) General discouragement and dejection in the face of the very long odds of 
making a significant positive difference with respect to the outcomes in 
question.
Often this leads to another and more serious kind of de-moralization:
(D2) Loss of psychological resolve required to do what the agent still  takes 
herself to have moral reason to do.
Let’s call the state of being doubly demoralized in this way despair. When we fall 
into despair, we are liable to give up boycotts and revert to purchasing whatever is 
most convenient, tasty, and affordable—despite any ongoing moral qualms.30
Kant was acutely aware of our psychological vulnerability to perceived ineffi-
cacy in the face of large-scale evil and injustice. In one of his most lyrical passages 
in third Critique, he considers the psychology of an atheistic but ‘righteous man 
(like Spinoza)’ who
does not demand any advantage for himself from his conformity to the moral 
law, whether in this world or another; rather, he would simply and unselfishly 
bring about the good to which that holy law directs all his powers.
30 This is clearly anecdotal and conjectural. To make the case we would need to look at sociological 
studies of consumer and activist behaviour in response to perceptions of inefficacy. Interestingly, the 
Meat Institute itself cites recent CNN and USDA survey data showing that of the approximately 
5 percent of Americans who claim to be vegetarians, around 65 percent will confess to having eaten 
meat products in the past 24 hours. The Meat Institute’s conclusion? ‘Bottom line: meat is amazing—
and irresistible’. (North American Meat Institute, n.d., 2) https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.
php?ht=d/sp/i/101931/pid/101931, accessed 1 November 2019.
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Such a person’s resolve, Kant says, is still liable to be sapped by the perception that 
his own moral strivings, as well as those of others, are inefficacious against large-
scale structural evil and injustice:
But his strivings (Bestreben) have limits . . . Deceit, violence, and envy always sur-
round him, even though he is himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent. The 
other righteous people that he encounters at times will, in spite of all their 
worthi ness to be happy, nevertheless be subject by nature, which pays no respect 
to that, to all the evils (Übeln) of poverty, illnesses, and untimely death, just like 
all the other animals on earth. It will always remain so until one wide grave 
engulfs them all together (whether honest or dishonest, here it makes no differ-
ence) and hurls them, the very ones who were capable of believing that they 
were the final purpose (Endzweck) of all creation, back into the abyss of the pur-
poseless chaos of matter (Schlund des zwecklosen Chaos der Materie) from which 
they all were drawn. (CPJ 5:452)
In the end, when faced with the abyss in this way, the righteous Spinoza has two 
options: either he will ‘certainly have to give up his end [i.e. of being righteous] as 
impossible’ or ‘he will have to accept (annehmen) the existence of a moral author 
of the world (Welturheber), i.e. of God, from a practical point of view’.31 I read 
‘impossible’ here psychologically: even someone as righteous as Spinoza simply 
cannot maintain his resolve without some source of hope that, ultimately, justice 
will prevail.32
These reflections on demoralization suggest that, in addition to the sobering 
empirical facts about the industrial food system, there is another empirical ques-
tion that we need to consider in connection with inefficacy. It is an empirical-
psychological question about which sorts of background commitments or 
mindsets do better by way of helping ordinary agents avoid despair in the face of 
perceived inefficacy. Kant clearly thought that someone who accepts the existence 
of a benevolent deity working behind the scenes to bend the arc of history towards 
justice—presumably also recording and rewarding our efforts—will have more 
resources to sustain those efforts, despite long-term setbacks and perceived inef-
ficacy. Kant is not alone in this: supersensible commitments are clearly effective 
in both providing motivation and sustaining resolve, and many ‘moral arguments’ 
along these lines can be found throughout the nineteenth-century Pragmatist, 
Idealist, and Existentialist traditions. But Kant is the éminence grise: ‘What may I 
hope?’, he says in the Critique, is one of the three questions that motivate his 
31 ‘Accept’ here is ‘annehmen’, the verb Kant often associates with the noun ‘Glaube’ (faith).
32 Camus (1942) famously rejects this: he considers the same predicament and says that we must 
both accept the demands of the moral law and embrace the absurdity of a world in which justice never 
prevails: ‘One must imagine Sisyphus happy’.
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entire philosophy. So in the next section I propose to look more closely at the 
structure of his moral-psychological proof. After that we can consider whether 
some analogous forms of reasoning can help with psychological inefficacy prob-
lems in contemporary consumer contexts.
11.4  Moral Arguments for Theoretical Conclusions
Kant’s project in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone (1793) is to discover 
the rational essence of religion—the doctrines and practices that can survive 
examination by the tribunal of universal rationality. The result is called ‘moral 
religion’, ‘rational religion’, or ‘rational faith’ (Vernunftglaube) in order to distin-
guish it from creedal or enthusiastic forms based in special revelation or alleged 
mystical experience. At one point, he offers the following as the rational essence 
of the doctrine of providence:
Each must, on the contrary, so conduct himself as if everything depended on 
him. Only on this condition may he hope  that a higher wisdom will provide the 
fulfilment of his well-intentioned effort. (Rel. 6:101, my emphasis)
The passage displays what might be called a consequence-dependent moral psych-
ology. Kant is famously not a consequentialist in ethics generally: ‘The fulfillment 
of duty consists in the form of the earnest will, not in the mediating causes of 
success’ (CPJ 5:451). Nor is he a divine command theorist: ‘Morality . . . needs nei-
ther the idea of another being above him in order to recognize his duty nor as an 
incentive anything other than the law itself in order to observe it’ (Rel. 6:3). But 
Kant also recognizes that it is often psychologically crucial to be able to hope that 
our actions will have their intended results, even if by way of a supersensible 
mechanism (‘a higher wisdom’).
This fits with a general pattern of sensitivity to embodied, empirical psych-
ology in Kant’s ethical thought—i.e. sensitivity to the fact that it is hard to keep 
soldiering on in the moral life without the hope that it will do some good. The 
best state for human beings is not (as the Epicureans say) one of mere desire- 
satisfaction, but neither does it consist (as the Stoics suggest) simply in duty and 
virtue alone. Rather, the best state—the ‘highest good’—is a state in which happi-
ness is perfectly proportioned to moral worth. But happiness itself is at least 
partly bodily: it involves the satisfaction of our inclinations, many of which arise 
from our sensible nature. And in the Critique he says that ‘all hoping aims at hap-
piness’ (A805/B833). So despite the traditional picture of Kant as a rule-obsessed 
Prussian bachelor, he was in fact keenly aware that we are embodied ‘creatures of 
need’—animals for whom happiness consists largely in bodily and emotional 
welfare (CPrR 5:61). Although he does not endorse the satisfaction of our in clin-
ations willy-nilly (cf. his infamous remarks about ‘defiling oneself by lust’), he 
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consistently characterizes happiness as the proper satisfaction of the ‘sum total’ of 
them (MM 6:424–6; G 4:399, 418).
Behind his theory of the highest good, then, is Kant’s recognition that pro-
longed experience of injustice—of a world-history in which the wicked prosper 
and virtue seems to make no difference—can chip away at our resolve. In the 
Religion passage quoted above (from 6:101), he acknowledges that one of the 
things we hope for—and thus one of the things that make us happy, in the context 
of ethical and political action—is having our ‘well-intentioned efforts’ fulfilled. 
For example: suppose the moral law demands that we try to help the disadvan-
taged by donating money to various causes; for Kant, this will be true regardless 
of actual outcomes. Still, he recognizes that most of us also have a ‘need’ for our 
altruism to be effective33: it helps us retain not our rational motive but our psycho-
logical resolve if we can believe (or at least reasonably hope) that the needy are 
genuinely benefiting from our efforts. So even in a Kantian context, a morally 
good person can reasonably care a lot about the goodness of the consequences of 
her willing, and not just about the goodness of her will.
This is a complicated piece of reasoning, so it is worth looking at it in stepwise 
fashion:34
 (1) I ought to do what is morally right. [Independent argument]
 (2) For me, it would be demoralizing in the (D1) sense (i.e. it would lead to 
discouragement and dejection) not to be able to have substantial hope that 
there is a moral order by which a just arrangement (i.e. a ‘moral world’) 
will come about, for then I would have to regard it as certain that the 
entire history of the world will not be good on the whole, no matter what I 
do. [Empirical premise, concept of ‘hope’]
 (3) Such demoralization has an enervating effect on my resolve, and is thus de-
moralizing in the second, (D2) sense: I will almost certainly no longer per-
form actions that I take to be morally good or required. [Empirical premise]
 (4) Despair of this sort is seriously morally undesirable. [From (1)–(3)]
33 The ‘effective altruism’ movement introduces itself as follows: ‘Most of us want to make a differ-
ence. We see suffering, injustice, and death, and are moved to do something about them. But working 
out what that ‘something’ is, let alone actually doing it, is a difficult problem. It would be easy to be 
disheartened by the challenge’ (https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/introduction-to-effective-
altruism, accessed 1 November 2019).
34 Robert M. Adams sketched an empirical-psychological way of reconstructing Kant’s proof in his 
(1979). My presentation here is influenced by his, though also different in many key respects. In the 
first Critique, Kant presents an early version of the moral proof according to which hope for happiness 
seems to be part of the incentive for acting rightly. In the second Critique, he provides the more canon-
ical articulation of the proof that starts not with (1) above but with the more controversial claim that 
we ought to will the highest good, and this involves, as a sort of presupposition, adopting moral faith 
in the existence whatever is required to make the highest good really possible (i.e. God and the after-
life). For articulations of that form of the proof, see Wood (1970) and Willaschek (2016). Very little 
attention has been devoted to the moral-psychological argument from despair in the third Critique 
and Religion, although see Fugate (2015) and Ebels-Duggan (2016).
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 (5) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage for me in being able to have 
substantial hope that there is a moral world order. [From (2)–(4)]
 (6) Substantial hope that p requires the positive belief or faith that p is really, 
practically possible. [Theoretical premise]
 (7) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage for me in being able to 
believe or have faith that a moral world order is really, practically possible. 
[From (5)–(6)]
 (8) If a being or state of affairs is really practically possible, then there must 
be something in the actual world that can account for that fact. [Concept 
of ‘real practical possibility’]
 (9) The actual existence of God provides the only adequate account of the 
real, practical possibility of a moral world order. [Theoretical premise]
 (10) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage, for me at least, in being able 
to believe or have faith that God exists. [From (7)–(9)]
 (11) There are no good epistemic reasons either for or against the existence of 
God. [Results of examination of natural theology in Transcendental 
Dialectic]
 (12) Rational belief requires good epistemic reasons. [Kant’s evidentialism 
about belief 35]
 (13) Therefore, belief in God’s existence or non-existence is irrational. [From 
(11)–(12)]
 (14) Rational faith (Vernunftglaube) does not require good epistemic reasons; 
it can instead be based on good moral or pragmatic reasons. [Conceptual 
truth36]
 (15) Therefore, faith (though not belief) that God exists is prima facie morally 
(though not epistemically) justified, for me at least. [From (10), (13), (14)]
The ‘for me at least’ sounds worrisome, but Kant is explicit: ‘I must not even say 
‘It is morally certain that there is a God’, etc., but rather ‘I am morally certain’ etc’. 
(A829/B857, original emphasis). Still, the proof does not count as an exercise in 
mere wishful thinking or self-deception, provided a few conditions are met:
 • The justification is moral rather than epistemic
 • The justification is defeasible
 • The result is not the attitude that we would call ‘belief ’ and Kant would call 
logical ‘conviction’ (Überzeugung). The result, rather, is faith (Glaube).
35 Kant is a conceptual evidentialist about what we would call ‘belief ’—the kind of holding-for-true 
(Fürwahrhalten) that can count, if true and justified, as knowledge (Wissen) (Kant calls it ‘conviction’ 
(Überzeugung), as do many contemporary German epistemologists). See Chignell 2007a.
36 Rational faith, for Kant, is a voluntary state of holding-for-true (Fürwahrhalten) that, for non-
epistemic reasons, a subject uses to guide deliberation, action, and assertion in certain contexts. See 
Chignell (2007b).
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 • The faith in question is about a state of affairs that is evidentially ambiguous 
(in this case theoretically undecidable; see discussion below)
Let’s take a closer look at a couple of the key premises. Regarding (6): everyone 
agrees that there is some sort of modal constraint on hope, but it is clear that 
superficial hopes often involve merely taking possibility for granted (see Chignell 
2014). Deep, life-structuring hopes that p, on the other hand, arguably do require 
moderately clear conceptions of how, given the things and powers that exist in the 
world, p could turn out to be true.37 It would be extremely hard to hope in a ser-
ious way that there will be perpetual peace—to really structure one’s life around 
this hope, for example—without having at least some positive conception of how 
we denizens of the actual world could really get there from here. This is what I 
mean by ‘really, practically possible’.38
(9) is obviously another lynchpin; a friend of the argument would have to rule 
out other accounts of the real, practical possibility of a moral world: dialectical 
historical processes, political revolutions, a karmic system that ensures that just-
ice will be done, liberal democratic institutions, and so on (compare Adams 
1979). She would also have to explain why the full-blown classical deity, with all 
its omni-properties, is required to provide the relevant explanatory ground. Kant 
himself makes some efforts in this direction, but many readers have been uncon-
vinced (see Michalson 1999).
(11)–(14) are also crucial: the existence-claim here must be theoretically 
un decid able in order for the faith to be rational. Large swaths of the Critique of 
Pure Reason are dedicated to undermining traditional efforts to prove or even 
render probable the existence of God on either demonstrative or empirical 
grounds. Kant also rejects all atheistic arguments, including the empirical argu-
ment from evil. So, in the famous phrase, all knowledge-claims about God’s exist-
ence—theistic and atheistic—are ‘denied’ in order to ‘make room’ for the kind of 
moral faith that overcomes demoralization.
In the Religion passage quoted at the beginning of this section, Kant is not dis-
cussing a moral world order generally but rather hope for specific outcomes of 
specific actions. He clearly thinks that this hope, too, justifies faith in the existence 
of a supersensible mechanism: a providential ‘higher wisdom’ that makes the ful-
filment of our well-intentioned efforts possible. Returning to the contemporary 
inefficacy problem: it seems clear that people who already have such a supersen-
sible commitment can just focus their hopes around that. They can focus, in other 
words, on the possibility that this mechanism arranges things such that some 
of  their choices make a significant positive difference—both unobservable 
37 For the claim that there is a distinction between ‘superficial’ hope and ‘substantial hope’, and that 
the latter has extra conditions on it, see Pettit (2004) and McGeer (2004).
38 Compare Willaschek on ‘practical possibility’ (2016).
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and  observable. Their faith allows them reasonably to hope that their efforts 
matter—that they are recorded somehow, even if they seem to be inefficacious. 
And that hope would presumably sustain psychological resolve to keep doing 
what they regard as required. But is a version of this argument against demor-
alization available in secular contexts as well?
11.5 A Moral-Psychological Argument for Hope
Given that the industrial poultry system is deeply insensitive to slight changes in 
demand, any attempt on Hope’s part to inculcate full-blown belief that my absten-
tion is going to make a significant positive difference would be a miserable exercise 
in self-deception. Faith in that proposition also looks more like a Kierkegaardian 
leap than sweet Kantian reason. As we have seen, Kant anticipates James and 
 others in the moderate pragmatist tradition in rejecting the idea that a moral 
argument can support a conclusion whose negation we have strong epistemic rea-
son to believe.
With this in mind, let’s consider a moral argument that is based, like Kant’s 
own ‘proof ’, in a claim about what’s required for the substantial hope that sustains 
resolve:
 (1*) Don’t Purchase: It is morally wrong to purchase the bodies, secretions, or 
eggs of farmed animals if there are readily available alternatives to eat 
and wear. [From an independent argument or moral intuition]
 (2*) It would be demoralizing in the (D1) sense (i.e. it would lead to dis-
couragement and dejection) for me not to be able to have substantial 
hope that my abstention from animal products over time will make a 
significant positive difference with respect to animal welfare. [Empirical 
premise]
 (3*) Such demoralization has an enervating effect on my resolve, and is thus 
de-moralizing in the second, (D2) sense: I will almost certainly fail in my 
efforts to abstain over time. [Empirical premise]
 (4*) Despair of this sort is seriously morally undesirable. [rom (1*)–(3*)]
 (5*) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage for me in being able to 
have substantial hope that my abstention will make a significant positive 
difference with respect to animal welfare. [From (2*)–(4*)]
So far, so good: this looks like a simple argument for the practical rationality of 
hope that by abstaining I will somehow make a significant difference to the system 
in question. Note that ‘significant’ is left vague precisely because the amount of 
difference-making required to avoid despair will clearly differ from person to 
person.
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But what are the conditions on having this sort of hope? We saw earlier that
 (6*) Substantial hope that p requires the positive belief or faith that p is really, 
practically possible. [Theoretical premise]
But then from (5*) and (6*) we can infer:
 (7*) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage for me in being able to believe 
or have faith that it is really, practically possible that my abstention will 
make a significant positive difference.
People of great willpower may find it psychologically possible to leave things 
there. Even if they dearly miss the taste of deep-fried spicy mesquite chicken, they 
will abstain in the stubborn hope that this behaviour, over time, will somehow 
make a significant positive difference. Despite the incredibly long odds (remem-
ber those 2000 birds per second), they are able to maintain belief or faith that it is 
really possible—and that is enough to preserve their resolve.
But Kant thought such moral saints are rare: even someone as righteous as 
Spinoza might despair in the absence of some sense of how justice might prevail. 
For the rest of us, clinging to the brute possibility that we just might make a dif-
ference won’t be enough for long-term resistance, especially when the products in 
question are so convenient, tasty, and cheap. This is one reason why Kant’s moral-
psychological argument proceeds from a claim about what is really possible to a 
claim (in (8) and (9)) about the actual ground or explanation of that possibility: 
we need to have a sense, not just that it is really possible, but how it is so. What is 
it about the actual world that makes the hoped-for outcome really, practically 
possible?
Well, as we saw at the end of the last section, one idea is just this:
 (9*) The actual existence of God provides the only adequate account of the 
real, practical possibility that my abstention will make a significant posi-
tive difference. [Theoretical premise]
If this were correct, then the rest of the argument could run like the previous one 
and conclude with full-blown moral theism. Only such faith, this version of the 
argument might say, makes it psychologically possible to retain the hope that my 
abstaining (and/or my abstinence over time) will make a significant positive dif-
ference to a morally objectionable system. So that hope and that faith, together, 
allow me to avoid despair, and are prima facie morally justified as a result.
The problem here is obvious: (9) was debatable, but (9*) is just patently false. 
Perhaps there is some plausibility in the idea that the existence of a supreme being 
is the only adequate account of the real, practical possibility of a perfectly just 
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world order (the highest good). But in the case of the more localized hope that 
my individual actions will make a significant positive difference with respect to 
the industrial chicken system, (9*) itself is hopeless. We already saw back in 
Section 11.2 that there are naturalistic ways to account for the bare possibility 
here, even in a massive and lumpy supply system. It’s just barely possible, for 
instance, that this is the month in which everyone else will purchase exactly 
18,999,999 sandwiches, and thus that Oppy is indeed going to stand on one of 
those thresholds when he walks into the food court. If that were the case, then a 
choice on the threshold to abstain will make a significant positive difference 
(5,000 chickens saved!).
Given the availability of naturalistic ways of accounting for the real possibility 
that my abstinence makes a difference, then, there can be nothing like a moral 
proof that God, the ‘universe’, karma, or fate is arranging for individual efficacy. 
Again, if someone already has a supersensible commitment that can do the job, 
then it makes sense for him to fix his hopes by appealing to a premise like
(9**) The actual existence of supersensible mechanism X provides an adequate 
account of the real possibility that my abstinence will make a significant positive 
difference.
But for someone who does not already have the supersensible commitment, there 
is no compelling pressure to adopt one.
No compelling pressure. There might be a little pressure, though, depending on 
how we think about the naturalistic options and the psychological constraints on 
hope. I just said that someone like Hope who is threatened by demoralization can 
try to focus on the ‘infinitesimal’ possibility of her own pivotality—she can give 
that possibility a prominent place in her mind every time her colleagues drag her 
to the bar on ‘Shotz-n-Wingz Nite’, and this way allow the idea of 5000 chickens 
saved to sustain her resolve.39 But that’s not going to be easy: given the sobering 
empirical facts, the chance that she is at a threshold point there in the bar is van-
ishingly small, and it may be hard for Hope to keep from sliding into despair 
(especially after a few shotz). Indeed, according to the account of hope that I 
favour, the key difference between hope and despair has to do with where the 
subject is disposed to place her mental attention or ‘focus’. I might strongly desire 
something and regard it as possible, but if I keep focusing on it as massively 
improbable, I am in despair. If instead I am disposed to focus on it ‘under the 
aspect of its possibility’—i.e. as having at least a chance of occurring—then I am 
39 For more on how ‘Shotz-n-Wingz Nite’ can destroy a person’s resolve, see Halteman and 
Halteman Zwart (2016: 131). Those authors claim that such events occur regularly at a place called 
‘Baloneez’, but Barnhill et al. (2015: 171) reference a sister establishment called ‘Jimmy’s You-Hack-it-
Yourself BBQ’.
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hoping.40 But other things equal, the more unlikely a desired outcome is, the 
harder it is to stay mindfully focused on it as possible, rather than fixating on the 
overwhelming odds against. So while hoping for pivotality is an option for stav-
ing off despair, most of us will find it a hard psychological row to hoe.
In light of this, it would be useful to find some other naturalistic scenarios 
whereby Hope’s abstinence might make a significant positive difference for ani-
mals. A candidate that comes to mind is this: Hope’s decision might somehow be 
connected to the decisions of numerous other people such that, if she abstains, 
then a significant number of other people will or will be likely to abstain (where a 
‘significant’ number is precisely what’s required for there to be a ‘significant’ dif-
ference made with respect to animals—keeping in mind that what counts as ‘sig-
nificant’ might be different across different subjects). This scenario divides into 
two: one causal, and one evidential. I’ll discuss each in turn.
The causal version of the scenario would invoke this premise:
(9***) The existence of a causal connection between my decision to abstain and 
the decisions of a significant number of other people to do the same provides an 
adequate account of the real, practical possibility that my abstinence will make a 
significant positive difference.
This seems true: such a causal connection would provide an adequate account. 
Following the logic of the moral-psychological argument, we would then arrive at:
(10*) Therefore, there is serious moral advantage, for me at least, in being able to 
believe or have faith that such an interpersonal causal connection exists.
[From (7)–(9***)]
But could such belief or faith be rational? That is, could it ever be rational to 
believe or have faith in the following?
Interpersonal Causal Connection: If I choose to abstain, my action will cause a 
significant number of other people to abstain, and if I choose to purchase, my 
action will cause a significant number of other people to purchase.
Causal Connection looks like a non-starter for people who aren’t celebrities, dicta-
tors, or top-level ‘influencers’. There is no reason to think that there is any such 
connection between one’s person’s actions and the actions of a significant number 
40 See Chignell (draft). Note that I am not claiming that hope just is the desire and the presumption 
of possibility plus a disposition to focus on the outcome as possible. But I do hold that substantial 
hope is at least accompanied by these states.
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of others.41 A quick look at Hope’s number of Twitter followers provides decisive 
reason to think that there is not such a connection in her case. But then both 
belief and faith are ruled out on rational grounds (again, Kant is the forerunner of 
James rather than Kierkegaard here—a live option for moral faith has to be evi-
dentially ambiguous).
There is a weaker version of the scenario, however, that looks more promising. 
Consider:
(9****) The existence of a strong evidential connection between my decision to 
abstain and the decisions of a significant number of other people to do the same 
provides an adequate account of the real, practical possibility that my abstinence 
will make a significant positive difference.
(9****) seems true, and so by the logic of Kant’s moral-psychological argument, 
it would seem to give us prima facie moral justification for either belief or faith 
that:
Interpersonal Evidential Connection: If I choose to abstain, that is strong evi-
dence that a significant number of other people are likely to abstain, and if I 
choose to purchase, that is strong evidence that a significant number of other 
people are likely to purchase.
Is this a principle for which we have any grounds one way or the other? Here I 
think things are less obvious than they were with Causal Connection. It seems 
reasonable for Hope to think that a significant number of people could be mo tiv-
ated by the same reasons against purchasing animal products that she is (that 
might be a part of what it is to take them to be reasons). But that’s different from 
thinking that if she chooses to abstain, a significant number of people will be so 
motivated, or are likely to be so motivated. Given that most of these decisions will 
be made in distant places and times (and given that she is not a top-level influ-
encer), it is simply unclear whether there is any evidence for Evidential Connection. 
Indeed: even if, over the short- to medium-term, she acquires evidence that other 
people around her are not following suit, her choice might still be strong evidence 
that over the long haul a significant number of people (here or elsewhere) will 
41 Obviously Hope could try to establish such causal connections (and thereby shore up her resolve) 
by signalling her choices publicly when she can, attempting to influence others, becoming part of a 
broader cultural movement, and so on. And obviously the question of whether her actions have made 
any causal difference must be considered over the longer haul. It’s not clear how much this will help in 
private one-off moments under conditions of perceived inefficacy, however. Thanks to Elizabeth 
Harman and Renée Jorgensen Bolinger for discussion here. See also Lawford-Smith (2015).
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come around and see the power of her reasons.42 This means that in most epi-
stem ic contexts, anyway, belief either way would be out of rational bounds.
But here is where Kant’s famous idea about denying belief to make room for 
faith comes in. When there is no clear evidence one way or the other, we might 
still have moral reason for adopting propositions in this other non-doxastic way. 
So if supersensible mechanisms aren’t a live option for Hope, and if her own 
causal pivotality is too improbable to sustain her focus, she might still be de feas-
ibly morally justified in taking Evidential Connection on faith. That is: she might 
be defeasibly justified in holding that a significant number of people (somewhere, 
sometime) will be similar enough to her to act on the same reasons in a broad 
range of cases. Thus, if she chooses to abstain now, she will have strong evidence 
that there will be a significant improvement in farm animal welfare. Faith like that 
would presumably suffice to stave off Hope’s despair. However, if she think like 
this up to the moment of choice, but then defects and purchases (perhaps believ-
ing that all those other people will still act on the reasons that she has), she 
thereby loses her evidence that others will abstain. That is why it is crucial that 
Evidential Connection says that she only gets the relevant evidence if she actually 
abstains, and not just if she appreciates the reasons for abstaining.43
There is obviously more to be said about this last scenario, but here I simply 
want to note two of its most intriguing features. First, the reasoning is broadly 
Kantian in a manner that goes beyond the mere use of moral arguments. Hope 
relies on the idea that (other things equal) if she has a good moral reason to do 
something, then it is also good moral reason for others to do likewise. This is an 
implication of the universalizability of moral reasons—a theme that we typically 
associate with Kant. I have a good reason to act on a certain maxim only if it is a 
good reason for everyone else to do likewise in saliently similar circumstances. But 
the universalization goes the other way, too: if it is a good reason for me to act in 
such-and-such a way, then it is a good reason for everyone else in similar circum-
stances to do likewise. When Hope ‘thinks for herself ’ about these matters, she 
also takes herself to be ‘thinking from the point of view of others’—a maxim that 
Kant thinks of as common sense (CPJ 5:294). And so her moral faith in Evidential 
Connection invokes a broadly Kantian idea about the universalizability of reasons.
Second, and even more intriguingly, if faith in Evidential Connection is what 
sustains the hope to make a difference, then we seem to have arrived in a very 
roundabout way at a key principle of evidential decision theory (EDT). EDT says 
42 There are many dissimilarities between the cases, but just by analogy think of someone in late 
17th century South Carolina who decides, on moral grounds, to free the slaves that he inherited from 
his family. Those reasons were good, and in order to sustain his resolve he might also have taken on 
faith that his choice was strong evidence that others would (at some point) do the same. But it took a 
long while.
43 Thanks to Victoria McGeer for discussion here.
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(roughly) that an agent ought to perform actions that are such that, if she 
 performs them, then the chances of the desired outcome are maximized, regard-
less of whether there is any causal connection between her actions and the out-
come. It is sometimes characterized as the choice to be guided by ‘auspiciousness 
over efficacy’; it can also be articulated as a theory of difference-making:
Difference-Making, Evidential: An action A makes a difference with respect to 
outcome O just in case performing A provides evidence that a change in O 
will occur.
According to this principle, no causal connection is required for an action to 
make a difference. That is why EDT is thought to support taking the one box in 
the Newcomb problem.44 Even if there is no causal connection between your 
choice and the action of a near-perfect predictor of your choice (since the predic-
tion has already been made), there is an evidential connection: what you do pro-
vides strong evidence regarding what the predictor did. So on the evidential 
conception of difference-making, your action does ‘make a difference’ and you 
should take just the one box (thus containing a million dollars). On the causal 
conception of difference-making, your action can’t make a difference and so you 
should be safe and take both boxes (thereby acquiring a thousand dollars).45
On the scenario we have just been considering, Hope abstains for independent 
reasons (involving e.g. symbolic value worries or concerns about some sort of 
complicity), but she also has a psychological need to hope that her action makes a 
difference, especially over time. If she takes Evidential Connection on as an item of 
moral faith, with Difference-Making, Evidential in the background, then she can 
retain faith that her action makes a difference even while recognizing that the 
sobering empirical facts strongly suggest that her action doesn’t make a causal 
difference.46
44 Originally stated in Nozick 1969.
45 Jon Elster cites empirical evidence for the claim that people use ‘diagnostic thinking’ to move 
from the assumption that they are ‘fairly typical members’ of a reference group to the conclusion that 
others ‘will tend to act like me’. Elster sees no flaw in this sort of reasoning unless explicitly causal 
claims are made—i.e. unless people start thinking that ‘my action will bring it about’ that others do 
the same. But the EDT conception of difference-making avoids that sort of ‘interpersonal magic’. See 
Elster (1985: 142–5). Thanks are owed here to John Pittard, Ewan Kingston (who pointed me to 
Elster), Philip Pettit, Richard Bradley, and Kian Mintz-Woo, as well as to the unknown author of a 
paper I recently refereed in which a connection between one-boxing in Newcomb and an evidentialist 
account of difference-making was made. Mintz-Woo and Bradley point out to me that this interper-
sonal ‘evidentialist’ approach to consumption and voting cannot rationally be extended to Prisoner’s 
Dilemma cases, however, since defecting is always the best thing to do in the latter, even on EDT. This 
is presumably why followers of EDT have resisted Lewis’s claim (in 1979) that ‘Newcomb’s Problem is 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma’. See also Pittard (2018).
46 If this is correct, then the present broadly Kantian response to the psychological inefficacy prob-
lem has the added benefit of providing prima facie moral justification for faith in a principle that 
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11.6  Conclusion
Recent discussions of the inefficacy problem focus primarily on the conceptual 
side of the issue—that is, on how inefficacy poses a challenge to traditional conse-
quentialism. In the bulk of this paper, I focused instead on the psychological side 
of the problem—that is, on how the perception of our almost certain inefficacy 
can lead to the kind of despair that, in turn, threatens to undermine moral resolve. 
I suggested that although Kant’s own narrow view regarding how we ought to 
treat animals has little appeal, his moral-psychological argument against despair 
can be applied to justify various resolve-sustaining strategies. These include 
focusing in hope on the fact that:
A. An extremely unlikely threshold event can cause at least one of my abstaining 
actions to make a significant positive difference to outcomes.
Alternative strategies involve adopting defeasible moral faith in one (or more) of 
the following claims:
B. A supersensible mechanism exists and can causally connect my abstinence to 
some significant positive difference in outcomes.
C.  My choosing to abstain is strong evidence that there will be a significant 
 positive difference in outcomes, even if there is no causal connection between 
the two.
Although it has a structure that is analogous to Kant’s moral-psychological argu-
ment for the existence of God, only one of the options here involves faith in 
something supersensible.
A final, Kant-scholarly point: the structure of the moral-psychological argu-
ment I’ve been considering here reveals an underappreciated way in which the 
practical has ‘primacy’ for Kant. The argument says that if we morally ought to act 
a certain way, and we are threatened by resolve-sapping despair, then we are 
prima facie morally justified in seeking strategies that will sustain our hope and 
thus our commitment to the ought in question. But although the moral commit-
ment and the concomitant hope have primacy, Kant is not an advocate of 
ir ration al leaps. Theoretical reason does kick in at some point and require a 
coherent account of how the hoped-for scenario could really, practically come 
about. That in turn makes us prima facie morally justified in having faith in 
supports one-boxing. There is something right about the prosperity gospel after all: faith can indeed 
make you rich . . .
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whatever can adequately explain that practical possibility, as long as it is eviden-
tially ambiguous. The faith in question can even involve a ‘theoretical’ issue: an existence- 
claim, for instance, or a principle in decision theory.47
47 For feedback on these ideas as they developed, I am grateful to the editors of this volume and to 
Anne Barnhill, Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, Luc Bovens, Mark Budolfson, Gabriel Citron, Silvia De 
Toffoli, Tyler Doggett, Gabriele Gava, Matthew Halteman, Jakob Huber, Tania Lombrozo, Victoria 
McGeer, Kian Mintz-Woo, Philip Pettit, Michael Milona, Leigh Vicens, and Marcus Willaschek. I am 
particularly indebted to McGeer for lengthy written comments. I also thank audiences at Humboldt 
University in Berlin, Goethe University in Frankfurt, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, 
Georgetown University, Princeton University, and the unforgettable ‘Kant and Animals’ conference 
sponsored by University of Witswatersrand in the Krüger Animal Park, South Africa.
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